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Abstract
We introduce a class of learning problems where the agent is presented
with a series of tasks. Intuitively, if there is a relation among those tasks,
then the information gained during execution of one task has value for the
execution of another task. Consequently, the agent is intrinsically moti-
vated to explore its environment beyond the degree necessary to solve the
current task it has at hand. We develop a decision theoretic setting that
generalises standard reinforcement learning tasks and captures this intu-
ition. More precisely, we consider a multi-stage stochastic game between
a learning agent and an opponent.
We posit that the setting is a good model for the problem of life-
long learning in uncertain environments, where while resources must be
spent learning about currently important tasks, there is also the need to
allocate effort towards learning about aspects of the world which are not
relevant at the moment. This is due to the fact that unpredictable future
events may lead to a change of priorities for the decision maker. Thus, in
some sense, the model “explains” the necessity of curiosity. Apart from
introducing the general formalism, the paper provides algorithms. These
are evaluated experimentally in some exemplary domains. In addition,
performance bounds are proven for some cases of this problem.
1 Introduction
This paper introduces the setting of sparse reward processes. This captures
the essential problem of acting in an unknown environment, with an arbitrary
unknown sequence of future objectives. The question is: how do we act so as to
achieve the current objective as efficiently as possible, while at the same time
acquiring knowledge in order to be able to solve future objectives? Consequently,
it analogous to a number of real-world problems. These include both problems
in explaining and characterising human and animal behaviour, as well as the
design of optimal strategies in problems with high uncertainty about future
tasks.
In standard multi-objective problems, one must make decisions that balance
the relative importance of objectives. In practice, however, not all of the objec-
tives are applicable all the time and in many cases there may be periods where
no objectives are applicable at all. Nevertheless, optimal behaviour may always
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be defined with respect to possible future objectives. In our framework, the
agent assumes that future objectives are unkonwn, and can be unpredictable.
Thus, while the agent is acting to achieve the current objective, he also acts so
as to learn as much about its environment as possible, in order to be able to
perform well in any future possible objective.
We formulate this setting in terms of a multi-stage game between a learning
agent and an opponent of unknown type. The agent acts within an unknown
controlled Markov process, which remains constant (or more generally, is drawn
from the same distribution) at every stage. In addition, at each stage of the
game, a payoff function is chosen by the opponent, which determines the agent’s
utility. Loosely speaking, the agent must act not only so as to maximise expected
utility at each stage, but also so that he can be better prepared for whatever
payoff function the opponent will select at the next stage. We call such problems
sparse reward processes.
Our first technical contribution is a measure-theoretic formulation of the
payoff action that defines each stage. This allows us to relax the usual Marko-
vian assumptions with respect to rewards without necessarily making planning
intractable. In addition, we show that, when the opponent is nature, the en-
vironment can be described as an unknown MDP. Finally, we show that, when
the opponent is adversarial, a nearly optimal strategy is to maximise the in-
formation gain with respect to the MDP model, linking our formulation to
exploration heuristics such as compression progress and approximations to the
value of information [10, sec. 23.7].
Multi-armed bandit problems with covariates [17, 21, 13, 15] is a closely re-
lated setting, where again the payoff function is given at the beginning of every
stage. In that setting, however, the opponent is always nature and, more impor-
tantly, the only thing observed after an action is chosen is a noisy reward signal.
So, in some sense, it is a harder problem than the one considered herein (and in-
deed [15] prove a lower bound). Consequently, the main difference between this
setting and the covariate bandits (as well as the related multi-task bandit [12]
setting) is that there is always an underlying, observable, environment which
the agent can explore and learn about.
2 Setting
At its simplest, the setting can be formalised as a multi-stage game between
the agent, an opponent, and nature. At the beginning of the k-th stage the
opponent chooses a payoff ρk, which he reveals to the agent, who then selects
a policy pik. The agent’s expected utility for that stage is Vk , V (ρk, pik). If
the environmental dynamics are known for all stages, then it is straightforward,
but not necessarily trivial, to act so as to maximise the expected payoff across
all stages, by playing the optimal strategy for each stage and disregarding the
remaining stages. When the environment dynamics are unknown, but related
in some way across stages, then learning about the environment is important
for performing well in the later stages. The setting then becomes an interesting
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special case of the exploration-exploitation problem.
The remainder of this section presents the setting in more detail. Section 2.1
defines the environment that the agent is acting in. Section 2.2 introduces
the payoff function that the opponent chooses before each stage. Section 2.3
discusses the policy and the resulting value of the game between the agent and
the opponent. Finally, Section 2.4 puts all elements together in the formulation
of sparse reward processes.
2.1 The environment
As mentioned in the introduction, at every stage, the agent is acting within an
unknown environment, in order to maximise the expectation of a known payoff
function. The payoff function is chosen by an opponent, who however has no
control over the environment’s dynamics. For simplicity, we make the assump-
tion that the environment’s dynamics are constant throughout all stages.1 More
specifically, we define the environment to be a controlled Markov process:
Definition 1. A controlled Markov process (CMP) ν ∈ N is a tuple ν =
(S,A, T ), with state space S, action space A, and transition kernel
T , { τ(· | s, a) | s ∈ S, a ∈ A} ,
indexed in S×A such that τ(· | s, a) is a probability measure2 on S. The CMP ν
defines a discrete-time Markov process: If at time t the environment is in state
st ∈ S and the agent chooses action at ∈ A, then the next state st+1 is drawn
with a probability independent of previous states and actions:
Pν(st+1 ∈ S | st, at) = τ(S | st, at) S ⊂ S. (2.1)
In the above, and throughout the text, we use the following conventions. We
employ Pν to denote the probability of events under a process ν, while we use
st ≡ s1, . . . , st and at ≡ a1, . . . , at to represent sequences of variables. Similarly
St denotes product spaces, and S∗ , ⋃∞t=0 St denotes the set of all sequences
of states.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the transition kernel (and possibly
the state and action spaces) is not known to the agent, who must estimate it
through interaction. On the other hand, the payoff function, chosen by the
opponent, is revealed to the agent at the beginning of each stage.
2.2 The payoff
At the k-th stage of the game, a payoff function ρk chosen by the opponent. The
payoff function simply encodes how desirable a state sequence is to the agent
for the particular task. In particular if s, s′ ∈ S∗ are two state sequences, then
1However, this assumption can be relaxed.
2We assume the measurability of all sets with respect to some appropriate σ-algebra. This
will usually be the Borel algebra B(X) of the set X.
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s is preferred to s′ in round k if and only if ρk(s) ≥ ρk(s′). While in this paper
we assume that the opponent has knowledge of what the payoffs ρk are, we also
later discuss how to relax this to an agnostic opponnet.
The payoff functions are somewhat more general than the usual reinforce-
ment learning (RL) settings. Recall that in reinforcement learning the agent is
acting within a Markov decision process µ (MDP). This is essentially a CMP
equipped with a set of distributions {R(· | s) | s ∈ S } on rewards rt ∈ R, such
that Pµ(rt ∈ B | st = s) = R(B | s) for any B in the Borel sets of R. In
the infinite-horizon, discounted reward setting, the utility is defined as the dis-
counted sum of rewards
∑
t γ
trt, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor. We can
map this to our framework, by setting:
ρ(sT ) =
T∑
t=1
γt E(rt | st) =
T∑
t=1
γt
∫ ∞
−∞
r dR(r | st) (2.2)
to be the utility of a sequence of states sT . Note that in our case, making the
payoff function stochastic does not usefully generalise our problem, since it is
revealed to the agent at the beginning of each stage.
2.3 The policy
The payoff ρk is revealed to the decision maker, who then chooses a policy
pik, which he uses to interact with the environment. The controlled Markov
process and the payoff function jointly define a Markov decision process [14]
(MDP), denoted by µk = (S,A, T , ρk). The agent’s policy pik selects actions
with distribution pik(at | st), meaning that the policy is not necessarily station-
ary. Together with the Markov decision process µk, it defines a distribution on
the sequence of states, such that:
Pµk,pik(st+1 ∈ S | st) =
∫
A
τ(S | a, st) dpi(a | st). (2.3)
This interaction results in a (random) sequence of states s, whose utility Uk to
the agent is:
Uk , ρk(s), s ∈ S∗. (2.4)
Since we consider that the payoff function is explicitly revealed to the agent,
making payoffs stochastic does not usefully generalise our setting. However,
there is still randomness due to the fact that we sequence of states is random.
We set the value of each stage to the expected utility:
Vk , V (ρk, pik) , Eν,pik Uk (2.5)
The agent tries to maximise
∑
k Vk, the total expected utility across stages.
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2.4 Sparse reward processes
The complete sparse reward process is a special case of a stochastic game.[19]
However, we are particularly interested in processes where only few state se-
quences have payoffs. We model this by mapping each payoff function to a
finite measure on S∗. A simple way to capture this intuition formally is the
following:
Definition 2. A sparse reward process is a multi-stage stochastic game with
K stages, where the k-th stage is a Markov decision process µk = (S,A, T , ρk),
whose payoff function ρk : S∗ → [0, 1], is revealed to the agent not later than
after k − 1 stage is complete. The agent chooses policy pik, with expected utility
Vk , V (ρk, pik). The Markov decision process terminates at time t and the stage
ends, with fixed termination probability q.
The process is called sparse if there exists a measure σ on S∗ such that, for
every ρk ∈ R, the payoff measure λk on S∗, defined as:
λk(S) =
∫
S
ρk(s) dσ(s), ∀S ⊂ S∗, (2.6)
satiisfies λk(S∗) ≤ 1. The agent’s goal is to find a sequence pik maximising∑K
k=1 Vk.
Some discussion of this definition is in order. Firstly, the game is structured
such that the opponent does not necessarily have complete knowledge of the
underlying Markov process (which is out of his control) or the payoffs (which he
selects). Secondly, the agent’s choice of policy depends on assumptions about the
opponent. Thirdly, the fixed termination probability q is equivalent to an infinite
horizon discounted reward reinforcement learning problem [see 14]. Finally, the
last condition ensures that the opponent cannot place arbitrarily large rewards
in certain parts of the space, and so cannot make the task arbitrarily difficult.
In fact, the payoff measure construction not only results in a natural measure
of the sparseness of payoffs, but it also enables much of the subsequent technical
development, through the following rather trivial, but important lemma:
Lemma 1. Given a payoff function ρ for which there exists a payoff measure λ
satisfying the conditions of Def. 2 for some σ, the utility of any policy pi on the
MDP µ = (ν, ρ), can be written as:
Epi,µ U =
∫
S∗
ppi,ν(s) dλ(s), (2.7)
where ppi,ν is the probability (density) of s (with respect to σ) under the policy
pi and the environment ν.
Proof.
EU =
∫
S∗
ρ(s) dPpi,ν(s) =
∫
S∗
ρ(s)ppi,ν(s) dσ(s) =
∫
S∗
ppi,ν(s) dλ(s) (2.8)
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3 Optimality conditions
The optimality of a given policy for the agent depends on the assumptions made
regarding the opponent. In a worst-case setting, it is natural to view each stage
as a zero-sum game between us and the opponent, where the agent’s gain is the
opponent’s loss. If the opponent is nature, then the sparse reward process can
be seen as an MDP. This is also true in the case where we employ a prior over
the opponent’s type.
We begin by introducing some additional concepts. Firstly, let us define the
oracle policy for stage k:
Definition 3 (Oracle stage policy). Given the process ν and the payoff ρk at
stage k, the optimal policy pi∗ν,ρk is:
pi∗ν,ρk , arg max
pi
∫
S∗
ρk(s) dPpi,ν(s). (3.1)
This policy is normally unattainable by the agent, since ν is unknown. In-
stead, we assume that the agent maintains a probabilistic belief ξ over the set
of CMPs N , such that ξ(B) = ∫
B
dξ(ν) is the belief that ν ∈ B, for B ⊂ N .
In a purely Bayesian setting, such a belief is subjective, as it is based on an
arbitrary prior ψ. However, if it is actually known that the CMP was drawn
from some distribution ψ, then the posterior belief:
ξ(B | D) =
∫
B
∏
t,i Pν(si,t+1 | si,t, ai,t) dψ(ν)∫
N
∏
t,i Pν(si,t+1 | si,t, ai,t) dψ(ν)
(3.2)
conditioned on a set of state-action observation sequences D = { si, ai } from
the process, has good estimation properties.[6, 16, 11, 1, 4]
3.1 When the opponent is nature
Consider the case when the opponent selects the payoffs ρk by drawing them
from some fixed, but unknown distribution with measure φ(· | θ), parametrised
by θ ∈ Θ, such that:
P(ρk ∈ B) = φ(B | θ), ∀k ∈ { 1, 2, . . . ,K } , ∀B ⊂ R. (3.3)
In that case, the Bayes-optimal strategy for the agent is to maintain a belief ω
on the joint space of CMPs and Θ ×N and solve the problem with backwards
induction [3], if possible. This is because of the following fact:
Theorem 1. When the opponent is Nature, the SRP is an MDP.
Proof. We prove this by construction. For a set of reward functions R, the state
space of the MDP can be factored into the reward function and the state of the
dynamics, so S = R × S0. If there are K reward functions, we can write the
state space as S = ⋃Kk=1 Sk. Let the action space be A, such that there is a
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one-to-one mapping Mij : Si ↔ Sk. In addition, for any i, j all states s ∈ Si,
the transition probabilities obey:
P(st+1 ∈ B | st = s, at = a) = P(st+1 ∈ B | st = Mi,j(s), at = a) (3.4)
P(st+1 ∈ Sj | st ∈ Si, at = a) =
{
q, j 6= i,
(1− q), j = i, (3.5)
for any B ⊂ S. It is easy to verify that this is in agreement with Def. 2.
Unfortunately, in most cases, the Bayes-optimal solution is intractable [8, 3,
6].
3.2 When the opponent is adversarial
The expected utility of any policy pi given a belief ξ over N , is:
Eξ,pi U =
∫
N
(∫
S∗
U(s) dPpi,ν(s)
)
dξ(ν). (3.6)
Let P ∗ν and P
∗
ξ be the probability measures on S∗ arising from the optimal
policy given the full CMP ν and given a particular belief ξ over CMPs respec-
tively, assuming known payoffs ρ. The opponent can take advantage of our
partial knowledge and select a payoff function that maximises our loss relative
to the optimal policy:
`k(ξ, µ) , max
λ
∫
S∗
(P ∗ν − P ∗ξ ) dλk. (3.7)
The above definition clearly implies that the opponent should reduce payoffs in
sets of state sequences which have a much higher probability under ν compared
to under ξ. To make this non-trivial for the opponent, we have restricted the
payoff functions to ρ(S∗) ≤ 1.
Theorem 2. Consider a two-stage game, where there is no reward received
during the first stage, i.e. ρ1(s) = 0 for all s. Then, it is sufficient to choose the
policy maximising the expected information, in order to mininise our expected
regret.
Proof. See that:
`k(ξ, ν) ≤ max
λ
∫
S∗
|P ∗ν − P ∗ξ |dλk ≤ ‖P ∗ν − P ∗ξ ‖σ. (3.8)
Thus, choosing a policy that maximises the expected information gain, min-
imises the expected worst-case loss at the next stage.
This natural result is in broad agreement with past ideas of relating cu-
riosity to gaining knowledge about the environment (e.g. the work starting
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with [18]). Consequently, pure information-gathering strategies can have good
quality guarantees in this two-stage adversarial game.
For more general games, we must employ other strategies, however, as we
need to balance information gathering (exploration) with obtaining rewards in
the current stage (exploitation). Unfortunately, even for the two-stage game,
finding the policy that maximises the expected information gain is in the same
complexity class as finding the Bayes-optimal policy. For this reason, in the
next section we consider upper confidence bound algorithms, in the spirit of
UCB [2] and UCRL [9], which, although approximate, perform quite well.
3.3 Algorithms
Here we present two simple algorithms for SRPs. The first, Upper Confi-
dence bound SRP (UCSRP, Alg. 1) chooses policies based on simple confidence
bounds, similarly to UCB. The second, Bayesian Thompson sampling (SRP,
Alg. 2), chooses a policy by drawing samples from a posterior distribution.
In order to simplify the exposition, we restrict our attention to some arbi-
trary stage k and consider a setting where we have a finite set of policies P.
Each policy pi ∈ P, coupled with the unknown dynamics, defines a probability
measure Ppi(S) , Ppi,ν(s ∈ S). Let D be a metric between probability measures
on S∗, i.e.:
D(P,Q) =
∫
S∗
|P (s)−Q(s)|dσ(s). (3.9)
For any policy pi, let the corresponding empirical measure on S∗ be Pˆpi, and let:
Q(Pˆpi) ,
{
Q
∣∣∣ D(Q, Pˆpi) ≤ } ,
be a confidence region around the empirical measure. Then we define:
P+pi , arg max
Q:∈Q(Pˆpi)
EQ ρ (3.10)
to be the measure within the interval maximising the expected payoff. For any
i, we can define a signed measure cpi: P
+
pi = Pˆpi + cpi. In addition, there always
exists an optimal choice pi∗, such that EPpi∗ ρ ≥ EPpi ρ for all pi.
Algorithm 1 UCSRP: Upper Confidence bound SRP
1: Select the smallest {Q(Pˆpi) | pi ∈ P} s.t. P(∃pi : Ppi /∈ Q(Pˆpi) ≤ 1/k),
2: Choose pik such that E(ρk | pik) ≥ E(ρk | pi) for all pi.
3: Execute pik, observe outcome s and payoff ρ(s).
4: Update {Pˆpi | pi ∈ P}.
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Algorithm 2 BTSRP: Bayesian Thompson sampling SRP
1: Set initial beliefs ξ0(Ppi).
2: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: For all pi, sample Pˆpi ∼ ξk(Ppi).
4: Choose pik such that EPˆpi ρk ≥ EPˆj ρk for all j.
5: Execute pik, observe outcome s and payoff ρ(s).
6: Calculate ξk+1(·) , ξk(· | pi, s).
7: end for
Lemma 2. Consider a payoff function ρ with corresponding payoff measure λ.
Assume that  is such that confidence regions hold, i.e. that Ppi ∈ Q(Pˆpi) for
all i. For UCSRP to choose a sub-optimal policy pi, it sufficient that:
E(ρ | Ppi∗) ≤ E(ρ | Ppi) + 2
∫
cpi dλ.
Proof. Since UCSRP always chooses pi maximising P+pi , if we choose a sub-
optimal pi then it must hold that E(ρ | P+pi∗) ≤ E(ρ | P+pi ). Since the confidence
regions hold, E(ρ | Ppi∗) ≤ E(ρ | P+pi∗), E(ρ | Ppi∗) ≤ E(ρ | P+pi∗) and E(ρ | Pˆpi) ≤
E(ρ | Ppi + cpi). Consequently:
E(ρ | Ppi∗) ≤ E(ρ | P+pi ) =
∫
(Pˆpi+cpi) dλ ≤
∫
(Ppi+cpi) dλ = E(ρ | Ppi)+2
∫
cpi dλ
Theorem 3. Let cpi,k be the relevant signed measure for policy pi in stage k.
Assume that ‖cpi,k‖b ≤ anpi,k, with npik =
∑k
i=1 I {pii = pi}.
Proof. Let pi∗k , arg maxpi∈P ρ′kpi be the optimal policy at stage k in hindsight,
and let pik be our policy for that stage. Then the regret after K stages, LK , is
bounded as follows:
LK ≤ max
ρ
K∑
k=1
ρ′kpi
∗
k − ρ′kpik = max
ρ
K∑
k=1
ρ′kpi
∗
k − ρ′k
∑
pi∈P
I {pik = pi}
≤
∑
pi∈P
K∑
k=1
I {pik = pi}max
ρk
ρ′k(pi
∗
k − pi)
≤
∑
pi∈P
K∑
k=1
max
ρk
I
{
2
∫
cpi,k ≥ ρ′k(pi∗k − pik)
}
ρ′k(pi
∗
k − pi).
The actual shape of the confidence region, for UCSRP, and the belief, for
BTSRP, depend on the model we are using. In general, they have the form
ci = an
1/b
i , where ni is the number of times the i-th policy was chosen and
a > 0, and b ≥ 1, but can be tighter if there is an interrelationship between
policies. In this paper, we consider two types of games.
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3.3.1 Associative stages
There are a total of K stages. In each stages, the agent starts from an initial
state s0, then selects a policy pik, which takes him to some state s with prob-
ability Pν,pik(s|s0), which is unknown. Then the agent receives a reward ρ(s)
and the stage immediately terminates. The state space is discrete, and there
are N < ∞ policies. So, in a sense, this problem is a variant of the contextual
bandit problem, or the problem of prediction with side-information. In this
case, the context, or side-information is the reward function. There are, how-
ever, fundamental technical differences between this problem and the standard
contextual bandit setting.
For this game, if we assume independent policies, confidence intervals for
UCSRP can be constructed via Weissman’s bound on the L1 norm of deviations
of emprical estimates of multinomial distributions [20]. Then, for each arm i,
with probability at least 1 − δ, the true transition probability is within the L1
ball of radius:
ci =
√
2[(|S| − 1) ln 2− ln δ]/ni, (3.11)
around our empirical estimate. Similarly, for the BTSRP policy, we maintain a
product-Dirichlet distribution (see for example [3]) on the outcomes of actions.
3.3.2 Markov stages
Again, there are a total of K stages. In each stage, the agent starts from a
uniformly drawn state s ∈ S, then selects a policy pik. The environment is
Markov, and the stage terminates with fixed probability q, known to the agent.
Then the opponent selects a payoff for the next stage.
Once more, this game is similar to bandits with side-information. However,
now the different arms (policies) are no longer independent. For this game,
we can again employ the Weissman bound or a Dirichlet distribution for each
state-action pair if all sets are finite.
3.4 Experiments
We compared UCSRP with BTSRP, as well as the greedy policy for both games.
There are two variants of the games. In the first, the opponent is nature, i.e.
reward functions are sampled uniformly on the simplex {ρ ∈ R|∑s ρ(s) = 1}
for every stage.
In the second variant, the opponent is adversarial. This opponent has knowl-
edge of Pi, and also maintains the empirical distributions Pˆi. The ssumption is
that the agent, whatever its method, will use something close to the empirical
distributions anyway. Then the reward function maximising
max
i
EPi ρ− EPj ρ, j = arg max
i=1,...,N
Pˆpiρ
is chosen.
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Figure 1: Comparison of the expected cumulative regret after k stages, between
UCSRP and BTSRP, on a problem with a multi task bandit problem, for two
types of opponents. The first type, Fig. 1(a), is nature. There, the reward at
the next stage is drawn from a fixed distribution (the Dirichlet(1) distribution
on the reward simplex). The second type, Fig. 1(b), is adversarial. There, the
reward is chosen so that maximal expected regret will be incurred at the current
stage.
For discrete spaces, there is always a finite number of deterministic policies,
each corresponding to a unique distribution on the states, and consequently on
the payoffs. After a stage terminates, we move to the next stage. Consequently,
the overall problem is very similar to a linear context bandit problem, where ρk
is the side-information.
The results for the associative stages problem are shown in Fig. 1. It seems
that the UCSRP performance is quite good, with the BTSRP algorithm be-
ing even better, with a Dirichlet prior. In both cases, performance is severely
degraded when the opponent is adversarial (Fig. 1(b)) compared to when it is
nature (Fig. 1(a)).
For the Markov stages setting, results are shown in Fig. 2, for an adversarial
opponent and a stopping probability of q = 0.5 at every timestep of each stage.
There, we compare BTSRP with the stationary greedy policy, i.e. the stationary
policy which maximises payoff for the current stage in empirical expectation.
As can be seen clearly in both cases, the regret suffered by the greedy policy
grows linearly, while that of BSRP grows negligibly.
4 Conclusion and related work
We introduced the setting of sparse reward processes, which captures the es-
sential problem of acting in an unknown environment with arbitrarily selected
future objective. As such, it is a good surrogate for a number of real-world
problems. These include both problems in explaining and characterising human
11
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Figure 2: Comparison of the expected cumulative regret after k stages, between
BTSRP and stagewise stationary greedy policies, on randomly generated MDPs,
with 2 and 4 states respectively, against an adversarial opponent. The greedy
policy suffers linear cumulative regret.
and animal behaviour, as well as the design of optimal strategies in problems
with high uncertainty about future tasks.
We have shown that, in certain special cases of the game, a good strategy is
to maximise the expected information gain. This links the problem to previous
work on curiosity. In addition, we have shown how the problem is, in a special
case, a standard Markov decision process. Finally, we have evaluated two simple
algorithms and shown that they perform well on this problem.
Naturally, similar ideas have appeared in the literature previously. The most
closely related setting are multi-armed bandit problems with covariates [17,
21, 13]. Specifically, [17] considers a one-armed bandit problem in a Bayesian
setting, for an exponential family mode, and proves that a myopic policy is
asymptotically optimal, in a discounted setting. Yang and Zhu [21] uses a non-
parametric regression model for estimation and an -greedy policy. The main
assumptions are that the payoff functions are drawn from a known distribution.
There is also the recent work of [15], which prove a lower bound on the regret.
Finally, there are a relation to multi-task learning, such as [12], and in
particular to learning with multiple bandits [5, 7], which consider the problem
of finding the optimal policies for a number of sub-problems. The starting states
of Dimitrakakis and Lagoudakis [5] and the bandit problems of Gabillon et al.
[7] are loosely analogous to the different payoff functions seen here.
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A Auxiliary results
Lemma 3. If σ is a measure on (X,Σ) and ρ : X → R∗+ is a Σ-measurable
function, then
λ(A) =
∫
A
ρ(x) dσ(x)
is a measure.
Proof. Let A,B ∈ Σ with A ∩B = ∅.
λ(A ∪B) =
∫
A∪B
ρ(x) dσ(x) =
∫
A
ρ(x) dσ(x) +
∫
B
ρ(x) dσ(x) = λ(A) + λ(B).
The non-negativity of λ follows easily from the fact that ρ(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X.
λ(A) =
∫
A
ρ(x) dσ(x) ≥ inf
x∈A
ρ(x)σ(A) ≥ 0.
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